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INTRODUCTION
The doctrine that carves out “true threats” from First Amendment
protection has been unclear, in its scope and operation, since the exception was
first recognized more than half a century ago. This category of unprotected
speech was recognized by the Supreme Court in 1961, in a decision that
identified “true threats” as distinct from other, protected, potentially
threatening speech, but did not articulate a standard which lower courts could
apply to distinguish the two.1 In the fifty years since, the Court has addressed
the constitutional bounds of the true threat doctrine only once, clarifying that
true threats require some showing of intent.2 But even that more precise
articulation of the standard3 left unresolved whether the relevant intent
standard is what the speaker of a threat actually, subjectively intended, or what
a reasonable listener would have understood the speaker to intend. Rather than
revisit the doctrine and resolve the intent-requirement question definitively,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly declined opportunities to clarify, instead
deciding threat cases on statutory, rather than constitutional, grounds,4 and,
more recently, declining to hear new threat cases as they arise.5
Even as the development of the true threat doctrine has stagnated, the
nature of communication has changed dramatically with the advent of the
Internet and the increasing prevalence of social media. These new platforms
only heighten the stakes of inconsistencies in the true threat doctrine and
highlight the need for a clear standard that tells courts whose intent governs
whether a statement is a threat.6 While in-person communication has never
been immune to misunderstandings and erroneous interpretations, speech that
is mediated by information networks and binary code amplifies the potential
for a receiving user to interpret a statement as conveying something different
than what the speaker intended to convey.7 Where the potential for
1 See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969); see also infra notes 12–16 and accompanying
text (discussing Watts and the beginnings of the true threat exception in greater detail).
2 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 708; R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)).
3 See id. (“‘True threats’ encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate
a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or
group of individuals.”); see also infra notes 17–23 and accompanying text.
4 See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012-13 (2015) (resolving the appeal on statutory,
rather than First Amendment, grounds).
5 See infra text accompanying notes 38–43 (discussing the Court’s denials of petitions for
certiorari ﬁled by defendants prosecuted under threat statutes after Elonis).
6 See, e.g., Thomas “Tal” DeBauche, Note, Bursting Bottles: Doubting the Objective-Only Approach
to 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) in Light of United States v. Jeﬀries and the Norms of Online Social Networking, 51
HOUS. L. REV. 981, 1016 (2014) (noting that application of the federal threat statute to online speech
“expose[d] fractures” in the doctrine).
7 See, e.g., Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Linda Riedemann Norbut, #I"
+ U: Considering the Context
*
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of Online Threats, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1885, 1908 (2018) (“[T]he gun emoji . . . looks like a space
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misinterpretation is great, the principles underlying the First Amendment
should require that a speaker’s actual intent to threaten be proved as an
element of conviction, to sufficiently protect individuals whose speech might
otherwise be construed as threatening due to interpretive errors, idiosyncratic
usage, identity-based stereotyping, or other misrepresentation.8 But the same
online speech that reveals these weaknesses in the true threat doctrine can also
be relevant in resolving them, by providing a record of how online speech was
created, interpreted, and modified by a speaker and her audience.9 This
evidence, where it is available, should be put to use by prosecutors and defense
attorneys to enable factfinders to more accurately assess a defendant’s intent.
This Comment proceeds as follows: Part I outlines the development of the
true threat doctrine up to the current juncture. Part II briefly explains how a
carefully applied subjective-intent requirement should operate, in conjunction
with a requirement that the punishable speech be objectively threatening, to
protect the First Amendment rights of speakers by maintaining a protective
zone for individuals to engage in expressive—even hyperbolic—speech
without fear of prosecution for speech that inadvertently misses the mark. Part
III canvasses social science literature to suggest ways in which courts can more
meaningfully—and more consistently—engage with the context surrounding
utterances posted on social media, which can provide more evidentiarily
grounded insight into a posting user’s intent if he is prosecuted for an alleged
threat. Part IV assesses the extent to which courts hearing Internet-mediated
threat cases are already using contextual evidence to support findings of
subjective intent, and identifies shortfalls in the reasoning of these decisions
where more contextual evidence would facilitate more consistent, accurate,
and speech-protective outcomes. Part V considers one existing proposal for
procedural reform in light of current practices.
pistol on some platforms and like a revolver on others.”); see also Full Emoji List, v12.0, UNICODE,
http://www.unicode.org/emoji/charts/full-emoji-list.html [https://perma.cc/G4RH-59KV] (last
visited Dec. 18, 2019) (showing this and other variations in how the same emoji display across
diﬀerent platforms). How emojis display on diﬀerent platforms can signiﬁcantly aﬀect how they are
perceived by readers. See Jonathan Geneus, Note, Emoji: The Caricatured Lawsuit, 16 COLO. TECH.
L.J. 431, 451 (2018) (“Objectively, an oﬃcer pointed his gun at a cartoon. Subjectively, however, a
white oﬃcer pointed a gun at a black male cartoon.”).
8 See generally, e.g., Adam Dunbar & Charis E. Kubrin, Imagining Violent Criminals: An
Experimental Investigation of Music Stereotypes and Character Judgments, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL
CRIMINOLOGY 507 (2018) (ﬁnding that study participants who read “violent” song lyrics were more
likely to ﬁnd them reﬂective of “bad character” if told that they were lyrics to a rap song, rather
than a song of another genre, or that the writer was black, rather than of another race).
9 See, e.g., The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Primer on Social Media, Second
Edition, 20 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 44-52 & nn.94, 100 (2019) (discussing various methods of accessing
and preserving both “static images of social media data” and the underlying “metadata, logging data,
or other information,” and noting that an individual post on Twitter or Facebook contains “over 20
speciﬁc metadata items”).
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I. BACKGROUND ON THE TRUE THREAT DOCTRINE
“‘True threats’ encompass those statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”10 Applying the
label of “true threat” to an utterance places it outside the protection of the
First Amendment.11 Cognizant that applying this exception broadly would
run counter to the First Amendment purpose of limiting government
interference with expression, the Supreme Court has always recognized the
need to limit the scope of the true threat exception.12 But the Court has so
far resisted clarifying the means by which legislatures and courts should
balance a government’s interest in preventing individuals from living in fear
after credible threats of violence with the imperative that distasteful or
unpopular speech that is not imminently harmful is still subject to the
protections of the First Amendment.
A. Watts Through Black—Uncertain Protection
In Watts v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
a statute prohibiting “knowingly and willfully . . . [making] any threat to take
the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States.”13
It nonetheless reversed the conviction of the defendant-petitioner, who had
been overheard in a small group discussion at an antiwar rally on the National
Mall, saying, “If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in
my sights is L.B.J.”14 The Court did not resolve the question raised by the
divided court of appeals below, as to whether a successful prosecution required
a showing that the defendant intended to carry out his threat.15 Instead, the
Court held that the threat at issue could not be a “true ‘threat’” because, in the
context of political debate in which it occurred, “regarding the expressly
conditional nature of the statement and the reaction of the listeners,” it could
not have been interpreted as any more than a crude form of political speech.16

10 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708
(1969); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)).
11 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717-18 (2012).
12 Watts, 394 U.S. at 708 (“[W]e must interpret the language Congress chose ‘against the
background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open [sic], and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public oﬃcials.’” (quoting N. Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))).
13 Id. at 705 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 871(a)).
14 Id. at 706.
15 Id. at 707-08.
16 Id. at 708.
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Two decades later, in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Court clariﬁed in dicta
the reasoning behind the outcome in Watts.17 That opinion explains that the
harm caused by threats is the fear of violence they instill in individuals, the
disruption such fear can cause, and the possibility that the threatened violence
will actually occur.18 The Court relied on this explanation in Virginia v. Black,
the ﬁrst case after Watts to squarely address the constitutionality of a statute
prohibiting threats.19 There, the Court held unconstitutional a statute that
prohibited burning a cross with the intent to intimidate a person or group,
where burning a cross could constitute prima facie evidence of that intent to
intimidate.20 In light of R.A.V.’s explanation of the harm posed by threats,
intimidation constituted a “type of true threat, where a speaker directs a
threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim
in fear,” and that some cross burnings could—and historically, had—ﬁt within
this deﬁnition.21 But the second piece of the statute, which provided that the
fact of burning a cross would constitute prima facie evidence of the
defendant’s intent to intimidate, “strip[ped] away the very reason why a State
may ban cross burning with the intent to intimidate.”22 A jury would not need
to ﬁnd that a defendant in fact had a subjective intent to intimidate in order
to convict her, making it possible that the defendant could be convicted for
an act of “lawful political speech at the core of what the First Amendment is
designed to protect.”23
B. Elonis—Failure to Clarify
After Black, which struck down a statute that criminalized speech without
requiring that the speaker have a subjective intent to threaten, the question
nevertheless remained open whether the First Amendment requires such a
showing of subjective intent in a prosecution for a true threat.24 The Court’s
505 U.S. 377 (1992).
See id. at 388 (listing these as the reasons “why threats of violence are outside the First
Amendment”). The decision ultimately turned on a different question of First Amendment doctrine,
the “fighting words” exception, and held unconstitutional a statute that prohibited only fighting words
aimed at members of certain protected classes as an impermissible content-based restriction. Id. at 381.
19 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
20 Id. at 347-48.
21 Id. at 360.
22 Id. at 364-65.
23 Id. at 365; see also id. at 365-66 (“As the history of cross burning indicates, a burning cross is
not always intended to intimidate. . . . The prima facie provision makes no eﬀort to
distinguish . . . between a cross burning done with the purpose of creating anger or resentment and
a cross burning done with the purpose of threatening or intimidating a victim.”).
24 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16-20, Elonis v. United States (No. 13-983), 135 S. Ct.
2001 (2015) (noting a circuit split and “widespread confusion” as to whether Black meant that the
First Amendment required a showing of subjective intent in addition to an objective, “reasonable
speaker” showing).
17
18
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decision twelve years later in Elonis v. United States, its next and most recent on
the subject of true threats, declined to answer the constitutional question, instead
relying again on principles of statutory interpretation to read a subjective-intent
requirement into the general federal threat statute, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).25
Elonis was convicted under § 875(c) for posting “graphically violent” rap
lyrics on a Facebook page, first under his real name and then using a pen
name.26 While some of the lyrics Elonis posted referred to clearly fictitious
people and situations, others referenced his coworkers and “included crude,
degrading, and violent material about his soon-to-be ex-wife,” and caused the
people referenced to fear for their safety.27 The district court rejected Elonis’s
request for a jury instruction that a conviction required proof of Elonis’s
“inten[t] to communicate a true threat,” a question raised by Elonis’s testimony
that his lyrics were fictitious—like those of the rapper Eminem, who has never
been prosecuted for recording songs with lyrics that included specific
“fantasies of killing his ex-wife.”28 The jury was instead instructed to convict
Elonis if a reasonable person would foresee that the lyrics would be interpreted
as a threat, and on that basis they found him guilty of violating § 875(c).29
In vacating Elonis’s conviction and remanding the case for further
proceedings under a subjective-intent standard, the Supreme Court rejected
the notion that convictions under this particular statute could be supported by
only a showing that the defendant “himself knew the contents and context of
[the Facebook posts that formed the basis for his prosecution], and a
reasonable person would have recognized that the posts would be read as
genuine threats.”30 Such a conviction would impermissibly rely on a negligence
standard, which is out of place in the context of criminal prosecution.31
In separate dissents, Justices Alito and Thomas criticized the majority for
leaving open the question whether a showing of recklessness could also
25 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012, 2013 (2015); see also 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2018) (prohibiting
“transmit[ting] in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to
kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another”).
26 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2004-05.
27 Id. at 2005-06.
28 Id. at 2007-08. One of Elonis’s posts referencing his ex-wife—and the restraining order she
had obtained against him—included the following lyrics: “Fold up your [protection-from-abuse
order] and put it in your pocket / Is it thick enough to stop a bullet? / . . . And if worse comes to
worse / I’ve got enough explosives / to take care of the State Police and the Sheriﬀ ’s Department.”
Id. at 2006. In a song titled “Kim,” the name of his ex-wife, Eminem raps: “Ha-ha, gotcha! Go ahead,
yell! / Here, I’ll scream with you, ‘Ah! Somebody help!’ / Don’t you get it, bitch? No one can hear
you! / Now shut the fuck up, and get what’s comin’ to you! / You were supposed to love me! / Now
bleed, bitch, bleed!” Eminem — Kim Lyrics, GENIUS LYRICS, https://genius.com/Eminem-kim-lyrics
[https://perma.cc/J4SH-8XMK].
29 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2007.
30 Id. at 2011.
31 Id.
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support a conviction under § 875(c).32 Justice Thomas objected to the
majority opinion’s eﬀect of displacing the precedent of nine circuits, which
he characterized as requiring proof of “general intent” for conviction under
§ 875(c), and providing no speciﬁc guidance as to what standard replaced it.33
Justice Thomas further contended that neither Watts nor Black had come to
any conclusion on a constitutional requirement to consider the subjective
intent behind a threat—and that in any event, an objective test, which asked
how a reasonable speaker in the defendant’s position would have expected his
utterance to be received, would confer suﬃcient protection because it would
“forc[e] jurors to examine the circumstances in which a statement is made.”34
Justice Alito argued that the Court should have clariﬁed that a mens rea of
recklessness was suﬃcient, both to support a criminal conviction and to
interpret § 875(c) in a manner that did not violate the First Amendment.35
Because the harm with which threat statutes are concerned does not change
based on the speaker’s mental state, in Justice Alito’s reading, the applicability
of the true-threat exception to First Amendment protection could not turn
on this distinction.36 Instead of requiring a mens rea of knowledge or purpose,
Justice Alito proposed that evaluating speech in the proper context would be
suﬃcient to protect speakers who engage in artistic expression not meant to
put anyone in fear of harm.37
C. After Elonis—Opportunities to Elaborate
The Court has not yet faced the two questions left open by its decision in
Elonis: whether showing recklessness as to a statement’s possible interpretation
is a sufficiently high bar to support a conviction under § 875(c), and whether
the Constitution requires a showing of subjective intent at all for threat
convictions. Justice Sotomayor’s “reluctant[] concur[rence]” in the 2017 denial
of certiorari in Perez v. Florida recognized that some clarification is needed on
32 See id. at 2013 (“Both Justice Alito and Justice Thomas complain about our not deciding
whether recklessness suﬃces for liability under Section 875(c).” (capitalization altered)).
33 Id. at 2018 (explaining that the previous standard had “require[d] no more than that a
defendant knew he transmitted a communication, knew the words used in that communication, and
understood the ordinary meaning of those words in the relevant context”); see also id. at 2022 (“The
majority . . . casts my application of general intent as a negligence standard disfavored in the
criminal law.”).
34 Id. at 2027 (quoting United States v. Jeﬀries, 692 F.3d 473, 479-80 (6th Cir. 2012)).
35 Id. at 2014-16.
36 Id. at 2015-16.
37 Id. at 2016-17; see also id. at 2016 (“[C]ontext matters. ‘Taken in context,’ lyrics in songs that
are performed for an audience or sold in recorded form are unlikely to be interpreted as a real threat
to a real person. Statements on social media that are pointedly directed at their victims, by contrast,
are much more likely to be taken seriously.” (quoting Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708
(1969)) (citation omitted)).
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both questions.38 In April 2019, the Court denied a petition for certiorari in
Knox v. Pennsylvania.39 That petition had preserved and squarely presented the
question “whether, to establish that a statement is a true threat unprotected by
the First Amendment, the government must show that a ‘reasonable person’
would regard the statement as a sincere threat of violence, or whether it is
enough to show only the speaker’s subjective intent to threaten.”40 The
petition sought review of a conviction under Pennsylvania’s terroristic threat
statute, interpreted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to require a showing
of only subjective intent.41 In arguing that clarification of the First Amendment
standard for true threats is urgently needed, the petition outlined the disparate
standards currently applied across the federal circuits and state courts.42 The
majority of states and some federal courts of appeals apply an objective-only
standard while a minority of states and other circuits apply a subjective-only
standard, with the result that in some cases, the standard to be applied depends
on “which prosecutor decides to bring charges.”43
Three Justices have now articulated an interest in clarifying the
implications of the Elonis decision: Justices Thomas and Alito in dissents to
that decision and Justice Sotomayor in her concurrence in the denial of
certiorari in Perez. But the Court still summarily denied the petition for
certiorari in Knox. In doing so, the Court again declined to actually clarify the
constitutional requirement that applies to statutes criminalizing threats. As
the Court remains silent on the questions raised by true threat prosecutions,
further questions accumulate behind that one: Not only are lower courts left
without an authoritative constitutional standard, but they are left to apply
these divergent standards to an increasingly broad range of social media
contexts which raise new and complicated questions about how speech should
be regulated. As a ﬁrst step toward recalibrating the scope of the true threat
exception, the Court should take the earliest opportunity to recognize a
uniform constitutional standard that requires proving both a subjective intent
to cause fear of harm and the objective, reasonable foreseeability of such
harm, in order to support a conviction for making a threat.

38 137 S. Ct. 853, 854-55 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (“In an
appropriate case, the Court should aﬃrm that [a jury cannot convict solely on the basis of the words
a defendant used]. The Court should also decide precisely what level of intent suﬃces under the
First Amendment.”).
39 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019) (summary order).
40 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Knox, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (No. 18-949), 2019 WL 277506
[hereinafter Cert Petition, Knox].
41 Id. at 6-7.
42 Id. at 9-14.
43 Id.
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II. SUBJECTIVE INTENT AS A NECESSARY COMPONENT
OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
Clariﬁcation of the intent standard will require addressing two distinct
sources of indeterminacy. First, imposition of any intent requirement
prompts a question of what proof will suﬃce. At its core, intent is an internal
phenomenon which produces no physical evidence and is knowable only by
the person who experiences it44—if at all.45 And it will rarely be in a
defendant’s interest to testify that she possessed the intent required to convict
her of a charged oﬀense.46 As a result, proof of intent much more frequently
turns on circumstantial, objective evidence meant to persuade a jury that the
defendant’s intent to bring about an outcome is the most reasonable
explanation for the way she acted under the circumstances.47 Disputes over
whether the circumstantial evidence oﬀered is suﬃcient to show the requisite
intent can arise in any area of law where intent is relevant; these disputes will
frequently involve narrow line-drawing based on the facts at hand.48
And such determinations are complicated further in prosecutions for
crimes effected through speech. Where a prosecutor establishing intent on a
murder charge, for instance, may point to laws of the physical universe in
44 E.g., Long v. State, 867 N.E.2d 606, 614 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 1 cmt. c, illus. 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2005);
David Crump, What Does Intent Mean?, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1059, 1071-72 & nn.82-84 (2010) (citing
Commonwealth v. Pond, 846 A.2d 699, 707 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004)).
45 For a brief overview of the “self-serving” cognitive bias and other ways in which individuals’
ability to accurately assess their own motivations are clouded, see Thomas Shelley Duval & Paul J.
Silvia, Self-Awareness, Probability of Improvement, and the Self-Serving Bias, 82 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 49, 49-50 (2002).
46 Cf. Crump, supra note 44, at 1072 (“[I]ntent is easily denied or rebutted, even when it exists,
and sometimes the denial is accompanied by convincing belief on the part of the actor.”).
47 See id. at 1072 (“[T]he law evaluates intent by what the actor does, which means that the law
evaluates intent by circumstantial evidence.”). The chasm between what subjective intent is and how
it is proved in a court of law highlights the need for a precise deﬁnition of the standard by which
intent is found to exist, as this standard will also determine what kind of rebuttal arguments are
judged suﬃcient to overcome the circumstantial evidence presented. See id. at 1072, 1074-78
(describing how diﬀerent forms of rebuttal of intent operate to undercut the persuasive value of
circumstantial evidence).
48 See, e.g., United States v. Souder, 436 F. App’x 280, 292 (4th Cir. 2011) (declining to overturn
the grant of a motion for a new trial on fraud charges where that decision was based on “the district
court[’s] cho[ice] to credit the Defendants’ innocent explanations for their actions over the sinister
interpretation posited by the government”); People v. Johnson, 27 N.Y.2d 119, 123 (1970) (concluding,
where a defendant’s testimony at trial denying an intent to commit burglary when he entered the
premises contradicted his statement to police and extrinsic evidence from the time of his arrest, that
the resolution of the issue was “open to the People to test credibility by the inconsistencies in his
statement”); see also generally Baruch Weiss, What Were They Thinking?: The Mental States of the Aider
and Abettor and the Causer Under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341 (2002) (weighing
arguments for and against applying the same intent standard to prosecutions for aiding and abetting
criminal activity as for principal oﬀenses).
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establishing that a defendant must have known a certain outcome was
probable—and therefore was more likely to have been done intentionally than
unintentionally49—no such universal background rules exist for the causes and
effects of language use.50 Instead, the bounds of conversation are governed by
the context in which they occur, including the participants’ relationships to
one another, their subjective understandings of the situation, and any previous
interactions that have occurred between them.51 At the same time, though,
participants rarely make explicit within a conversation the rules by which the
conversation will operate.52 Where the ‘rules’ of a conversation are never fixed
or stated out loud but are nonetheless crucial to understanding what has been
said, a careful examination of context is crucial if one party is at risk of criminal
conviction for the content she contributed to the conversation.53
It is not a novel observation that speech and language are central to many
human functions,54 but it is one that has yet to be fully felt in the operation

49 But see Crump, supra note 44, at 1066-67 (characterizing the presumption that “a man is
presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts[]” as imposing a “preponderance”
or “awareness of likelihood” standard on criminal liability (internal quotation marks omitted)).
50 Trial lawyers use analogies to physical actions to explain intent to juries. See id. at 1073 &
n.95 (describing the author’s experience of explaining evidence of intent to a jury through the
example of a person who got up and walked out of the courtroom as intending to leave). But because
speech is so contextually determined, it is diﬃcult to imagine a comparably simple analogy that
would suﬃce to explain when a threat could be presumably intended.
51 See, e.g., H. P. Grice, Logic and Conversation, in 3 PETER COLE & JERRY L. MORGAN,
SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS: SPEECH ACTS 41, 45-46 (1975) (proposing “maxims” of conversation
that interlocutors must presume of one another, to explain how communication is eﬀective in the
absence of identiﬁable rules); Lidsky & Norbut, supra note 7, at 1909-10 (describing how “discourse
conventions” that govern online speech may vary across platforms and between social groups on the
same platform, causing online speech to be misconstrued).
52 See PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 172 (1966) (“Most
conversation . . . takes place against the background of a world that is silently taken for granted.
Thus, an exchange such as, ‘Well, it’s time for me to get to the station’, and ‘Fine, darling, have a
good day at the oﬃce’, implies an entire world within which these apparently simple propositions
make sense.”); Erving Goﬀman, Replies and Responses, 5 LANGUAGE IN SOC’Y 257, 259-60, 268 (1976)
(describing the embedded meanings and assumptions that allow “Milk and sugar?” to be a complete,
intelligible response to the question “Have you got coﬀee to go?”).
53 Cf. Caleb Mason, Framing Context, Anonymous Internet Speech, and Intent: New Uncertainty
About the Constitutional Test for True Threats, 41 SW. L. REV. 43, 101-10 (2011) (recognizing that an
objective-intent-only standard, without a requirement to show speciﬁc speaker intent, would render
threats a “perlocutionary” crime).
54 See, e.g., Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 176-77 (noting the “simple
but often overlooked fact” that “nearly all human action . . . operates through communication” and
the associated tendency of modern regulation to operate through speech rather than conduct);
Bonnie Urciuoli & Chaise LaDousa, Language Management/Labor, 2013 ANN. REV.
ANTHROPOLOGY 175, 176 (describing the rise of language skills in the contemporary United States
economy as both necessary skills and as a commodity in themselves).
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of First Amendment protections55—especially as increasingly more speech
occurs in the public or semipublic forums of the Internet.56 The increase in
the volume of public expression and the changing media through which it
occurs give rise to warring impulses as to how that speech should be evaluated
for First Amendment purposes. On one hand, the ease with which an
individual can dash oﬀ a tweet, Facebook post, or email to her federal
representative supports a view that online speech taken as a whole is less
formal, or even less important, than the written forms that preceded it, which
required more physical eﬀort to produce and cost more to disseminate.57
Crucially, even the register of the speech that prevails on these platforms can
contribute to the notion that online speech is less serious, meaningful, or
valuable than speech disseminated through other media.58
On the other hand, this apparently casual and largely frivolous speech
tends to remain publicly available, “recorded and searchable,” making it far
more accessible to audiences intended and unintended alike, indeﬁnitely.59
And when an instance of online expression like an insult or a threat is
discovered by an individual targeted by it (or a concerned third party), there
can be little hope of convincing that person that the speech raises less cause
55 See Shanor, supra note 54, at 176 (observing that because speech and expressive conduct
permeate so many areas of human action, a strong version of “the First Amendment possesses near
total deregulatory potential”).
56 See,
e.g.,
Edison
Research,
Infinite
Dial
2019
(Mar.
6,
2019),
https://www.slideshare.net/webby2001/inﬁnite-dial-2019 [https://perma.cc/56H5-3GP8] (navigate
to slide 5 of 62) (estimating that in early 2019 there were 223 million social media users in the United
States); see also Jacob Rowbottom, To Rant, Vent and Converse: Protecting Low Level Digital Speech, 71
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 355, 359 (2012) (“With the growth of digital communications, there is more
content being published than before . . . . This content includes not only professionally produced
content, but all the amateur content, conversations and comments that are made by users.”).
57 See, e.g., SI03, Inc. v. Bodybuilding.com, LLC, No. 07-6311, 2008 WL 11348459, at *5 (D.
Idaho Dec. 23, 2008) (advancing the “general understanding that Internet blogs, message boards,
and chat rooms are, by their nature, typically casual expressions of opinion”); John Cluverius, How
the Flattened Costs of Grassroots Lobbying Aﬀect Legislator Responsiveness, 70 POL. RES. Q. 279, 280-81,
286-88 (2017) (describing legislators’ eﬀorts to adapt to the higher volume of constituent contacts
made possible by email and other mass communication tools by searching for new heuristics to
indicate that a particular issue is of high importance).
58 See, e.g., Rocker Mgmt. LLC v. John Does, No. 03-33, 2003 WL 22149380, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
2003) (relying on the general appearance and style of messages on a message board, including
“grammar and spelling errors” and an absence of standard capitalization, to decide that no reasonable
observer would have taken a purportedly defamatory statement as fact).
59 Rowbottom, supra note 56, at 355-56. Even an individual who realizes after the fact that a social
media post was in poor taste may not be able to completely erase the record of the expression from the
Internet. See id. at 356 (describing the prosecution of a man who removed a “joke” page within hours
of creating it); see also SNAP INC. LAW ENFORCEMENT GUIDE 4, 9-10 (last updated Sept. 21, 2018),
https://storage.googleapis.com/snap-inc/privacy/lawenforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/54WF-SX8K]
[hereinafter SNAP LAW ENFORCEMENT GUIDE] (describing the methods by which Snapchat
messages, which are designed to disappear after twenty-four hours, can in certain circumstances be
recovered for longer periods of time).
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for concern because it occurred online or did not employ standard grammar.60
This inconsistent view of online speech—as generally less valuable or
meaningful than other forms of speech, but with the potential to do acute,
potentially legally actionable harm to individuals or discrete groups of
hearers—creates a trap for the unwary social media user.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that “First Amendment
freedoms need breathing space to survive,” and that this requirement puts the
onus on governments to draft laws criminalizing speech with “narrow
speciﬁcity.”61 Clearly that speciﬁcity should be required of mens rea as well
as actus reus requirements62: a statute that clearly delineates the type of
statement to be punished but that does not make clear whether a merely
reckless, rather than knowing or purposeful utterance, will be punished is
likely to have a chilling eﬀect on the overall amount of speech produced,
compared to a statute that clariﬁes that reckless statements are not covered.
And if the speech chilled by that vague statute would be legal and subject to
constitutional protection, then a criminal statute that is vague as to intent has
the eﬀect of restricting speech in violation of the First Amendment.
Some convictions under threat statutes that do not require a showing of
subjective intent to threaten would also have been upheld if a subjective-intent
showing were required.63 But in the jurisdictions that have continued to
require only an objective, reasonable-observer standard for threat statutes not
altered by Elonis,64 some defendants have been convicted for threats made
without a subjective intent to threaten. These defendants have been
sanctioned for speech that, under a subjective definition of “true threat,” would
arguably be within the heart of the First Amendment’s protective sphere.65
60 For examples of ungrammatical, “casual” online speech that nevertheless prompted the
targeted entities to commence litigation, see generally SI03, Inc., 2008 WL 11348459, and Rocker Mgmt.
LLC, 2003 WL 22149380. See also Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2005-07 (2015) (describing
grammatically incorrect online speech that caused the speaker’s ex-wife to fear for her safety).
61 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940)).
62 See 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 112 (2019) (“Mens rea is generally an essential element
of any criminal oﬀense.”).
63 For example, it would be difficult to dispute that a defendant who sent seven specific threats
of violence to an individual, her family, and an embassy over the course of two months, “accompanied
by threatening behavior,” did not also evince the subjective intent of putting the targeted individual
and her family in fear of violence. See United States v. Jordan, 639 F. App’x 768, 770-71 (2d Cir. 2016).
64 See Cert Petition, Knox, supra note 40, at 11-13 & nn. 4-5 (collecting cases from jurisdictions
that apply an objective standard alone).
65 See, e.g., United States v. Dierks, No. 17-2065, 2017 WL 4873067, at *1, *3-4 (N.D. Iowa Oct.
27, 2017) (allowing a prosecution for true threat to proceed under the Eighth Circuit’s objectivehearer standard for speech directed at an elected oﬃcial, over objections that the threats were
conditional, physically impossible to carry out, and actually intended to be “impolite criticism” like
the protected speech at issue in Watts); Lidsky & Norbut, supra note 7, at 1886-87 (describing the
attempted prosecution of a young man in Texas for what appeared, in context, to be a “hyperbolic
response to provocation,” a “rant,” or even a poorly calibrated joke); see also Brief of Amici Curiae

2020]

Context, Content, Intent

745

The fact that speech made carelessly and not clearly outside the protection of
the First Amendment can carry a sentence of, for example, six years in prison66
suggests that the objective standard does not offer sufficient protection.
Particularly where the kind of speech likely to be prosecuted under threat
statutes may be made off-the-cuff and in the heat of an argument, and where
the effects of a speech act are not as neatly foreseeable as the consequences of
physical actions, the absence of formal protection for inadvertently
threatening speech has the potential to chill a significant amount of speech.
At least some of that silenced speech would be politically productive or
facilitative of an individual’s development of personal conscience.67 Allowing
convictions for true threats to stand without a showing of subjective intent
leaves unpopular or borderline speech that could plausibly be viewed as having
a threatening effect underprotected, relative to speech that verges on the outer
bounds of the First Amendment’s protection for other reasons.68
An objective component, while not sufficient on its own to protect the First
Amendment interests at the edge of the true threat doctrine, is still necessary
in any true threat standard. The Pennsylvania law in the Knox case, which
allowed a conviction on a showing that the speaker acted with intent to terrorize
or intimidate, but without a demonstration that any observer actually
experienced fear or terror as a result, runs counter to the primary justification
for punishing true threats: that they do, in fact, cause identifiable harm to some
Michael Render (“Killer Mike”) et al. in Support of Petitioner at 16-17, Knox v. Pennsylvania, 139
S. Ct. 1547 (2019) (No. 18-949), 2019 WL 1115837 [hereinafter Brief of Michael Render (“Killer
Mike”) et al.] (recognizing prior uses of the phrase “fuck the police” in rap songs as a way to express
criticism of police).
66 Associated Press, Iowa Man Gets 6 Years for Threatening U.S. Sen. Joni Ernst, DES MOINES
REG. (June 14, 2018, 6:26 AM), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/crime-andcourts/2018/06/13/joseph-hilton-dierks-iowa-joni-ernst-cedar-rapids-capitol-police-federal-harassm
ent-twitter/700225002 [https://perma.cc/QY8V-WLPS].
67 Cf. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail . . . .”); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) (“The harm is the interference with the
individual’s scruples or conscience—an important area of privacy which the First Amendment fences
oﬀ from government.”).
68 See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927-28 (1982) (holding that
although “references to the possibility that necks would be broken . . . conveyed a stern[] message,”
“[a]n advocate must be free to stimulate his audience with spontaneous and emotional appeals”);
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964) (“[E]rroneous statement[s] [are] inevitable
in free debate, and . . . must be protected . . . .”); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959) (“[I]f
the bookseller is criminally liable [under the obscenity statute] without knowledge of the [book’s]
contents, . . . he will tend to restrict the books he sells to those he has inspected; and thus the State
will have imposed a restriction upon the distribution of constitutionally protected as well as obscene
literature.”); see also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amendment
Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 841-42 (characterizing Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass’n v. Bresler,
398 U.S. 6 (1970), as endorsing the idea that “speakers should not be held liable for ‘misreadings’ of
their speech by idiosyncratic or unsophisticated audience members” (emphasis added)).
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who hear them.69 Additionally, the vast majority of evidence of even subjective
intent will be objective, circumstantial evidence which already lends itself to an
objective analysis of the content of the speech.70 This finding is not only
constitutionally required,71 but also should impose only a minimal additional
burden in a prosecution for any speech act that could be reasonably regarded as
a threat—especially as compared to the magnitude of the defendant’s interest
in avoiding conviction for constitutionally protected activity.
The objective-intent standard ensures that speech must actually create some
risk of harm before it is punishable. The subjective-intent standard protects
speakers who use language idiosyncratically—or in a way unfamiliar to others in
a community—by requiring that a speaker know that his message may be seen
as a threat.72 In the contemporary linguistic environment of the United States,
where many linguistic communities occupy the same physical and discursive
spaces and there is no basis for a claim that one use of a phrase is objectively
correct,73 the First Amendment should be understood to require both standards
be met before a person can be criminally punished on the basis of her speech.
III. HOW CONTEXT CAN CLARIFY INTENT IN ONLINE SPEECH
The requirement of subjective and objective mens rea standards will not
resolve the other question left open by Elonis: what evidence will suffice to prove
69 Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146, 1158-61 (Pa. 2018) (interpreting Black to reject an
objective standard and relying instead on deducing the defendant’s subjective intent from the
content and context of his speech); Cert Petition, Knox, supra note 40, at 18 (“[V]irtually every
exception to the First Amendment’s protections includes a baseline requirement that the speech in
question be objectively harmful.”); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) (listing
“protecting individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear engenders, and from
the possibility that the threatened violence will occur,” as the harms against which statutes banning
true threats protect).
70 See supra text accompanying notes 44–47; but see infra note 143 (proposing that evidence of
an audience’s reaction can be probative of either subjective intent or a reasonable observer’s reaction,
depending on when the defendant became aware of the reaction).
71 See Cert Petition, Knox, supra note 40, at 18 (“[T]he objective standard is the constitutionally
mandated minimum protection for all speech onto which th[e] Court has layered additional protections.”).
72 Cf. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 313 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“The law of New
York does not segregate, according to their diverse nationalities, races, religions, or political
associations, the vast hordes of people living in its narrow conﬁnes. Every individual in this
frightening aggregation is legally free to live, to labor, to travel, when and where he chooses.”); see
also id. at 301 (“A hostile reception of his subject certainly does not alone destroy one’s right to
speak. . . . [I]n a free society all sects and factions, as the price of their own freedom to preach their
views, must suﬀer that freedom in others.”).
73 See Richard A. Epstein, Linguistic Relativism and the Decline of the Rule of Law, 39 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 583, 589 (2016) (describing twentieth-century language philosophers’ rejection of
“the notion that language has consistent and coherent usage”); Arturo Madrid, Oﬃcial English: A
False Policy Issue, 508 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 62, 63 (1990) (“Contrary to popular
belief, American society never enjoyed a golden age in which we all spoke English; we never were
all one linguistically.”).

2020]

Context, Content, Intent

747

a subjective intent to put some audience member in fear of serious harm. Since
2016, convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) have required a showing of some
specific intent as to the threat alleged.74 But the Supreme Court has yet to hear an
appeal of a conviction under this new standard; it has thus provided no guidance
as to what evidence supports a conviction under a subjective-intent standard—
beyond the bedrock principle that in evaluating threats, “context matters.”75 The
context of how a defendant communicated a threatening message has the potential
to illuminate, among other things, why the defendant made the utterance at issue,
why he chose the words (or pictures or characters) he chose, whom he intended to
reach with his message, and how he expected the message to be understood by his
intended audience. With the advent of social media, speakers have an enormous,
novel opportunity to craft messages such that the choice of platform, audience,
and form may actually reflect a speaker’s conscious thought about how a message
would be delivered76—but at the same time, of course, platforms like Facebook,
Twitter, and message boards are also used impulsively by speakers posting without
such conscious objectives.77 Where evidence that can provide insight into speakers’
intents exists, and where some showing of intent to threaten is a constitutionally
required element of a threat prosecution, not using available contextual evidence
to better understand speakers’ intents constitutes an inexplicable oversight by the
criminal justice system. This Part draws from existing research in the fields of
sociology and linguistics to propose ways in which context—especially online—
can provide evidence of what a speaker intended to communicate in making a
public statement.
See supra text accompanying notes 25–31 (describing the holding in Elonis).
Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2016 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); see also Lidsky & Norbut, supra note 7, at 1888 (“[E]stablishing the full context
of [the defendant’s online comments made on Facebook] should be an essential part of determining
whether he made terroristic threats or merely talked trash with a fellow video gamer.”).
76 See, e.g., The Secret Formula to Creating a Viral Instagram Post, SOCIALINSIGHT.IO,
https://socialinsight.io/the-secret-formula-to-creating-a-viral-instagram-post/ [https://perma.cc/PG94RGGQ] (last visited Nov. 15, 2019) (advising that “go[ing] viral” requires “know[ing] what photos to
post, when to upload them, and how to connect with other users on the network to gain more followers
and likes”); see also Kevin Roose & Keith Collins, Who’s Winning the Social Media Midterms, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/18/us/politics/social-election.html
[https://perma.cc/S38D-CSDL] (describing the success of various political campaigns at increasing their
candidates’ social media engagement).
77 See, e.g., Stephanie McNeal, People Are Freaking out over This Girl’s Sad Picture of Her Grandpa,
BUZZFEED NEWS
(Mar.
20,
2016,
6:23
PM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com
/article/stephaniemcneal/paw-paw-why [https://perma.cc/QA7N-WC7M] (interviewing a woman
who posted a captioned photo of her grandfather “not expecting it to even get a retweet,” and
describing the viral reception the photo received); see also mstem, Thinking About the People Behind the
Viral Videos, MIT CTR. FOR CIVIC MEDIA (May 7, 2012), https://civic.mit.edu/2012/05/07/thinkingabout-the-people-behind-the-viral-videos/ [https://perma.cc/86UF-DSZ6] (collecting stories of
people whose Internet speech attracted unexpected, outsized attention and contemplating the
consequences of “go[ing] viral”).
74
75
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A. Accounting for Speaker Identity
It is widely acknowledged that gender-based, class-based, ethnic,
geographic, social, and other groups to which a person belongs can aﬀect and
be aﬀected by how she uses language.78 There is also reason to believe that
individuals maintain internally consistent writing styles throughout their
lifetimes, remaining somewhat constant across subject matters as well.79 The
implications of these ﬁndings on threat prosecutions are admittedly weak but
nevertheless worth noting. Preliminary research suggests that variations in a
person’s writing style can reveal changes in personality or mental health;80
while this research is not remotely advanced enough to read the objective
evidence of a threatening communication to reveal subjective intent to
threaten, it nonetheless bolsters the argument that a careful, close reading of
a written statement can provide useful information about a speaker’s intent.
Additionally, although it is unlikely that a person could go long in the world
without being alerted that her idiosyncratic personal writing style made her
innocent statements appear threatening, such a person (if she exists) should
have the opportunity to show a lack of notice to disprove that she knew or
intended that her statement would be interpreted as a threat.
B. Accounting for Audience
Although individual writing styles are relatively internally consistent,
people do modulate the way they present themselves in online interactions,
just as they might in person,81 based on whom they understand to be their
78 See, e.g., Umashanthi Pavalanathan & Jacob Eisenstein, Audience-Modulated Variation in
Online Social Media, 90 AM. SPEECH 187, 187 (2015) (“Linguistic diﬀerences are robust enough to
support unnervingly accurate predictions of [identity] characteristics based on writing style—with
algorithmic predictions in some cases outperforming those of human judgments.” (citation
omitted)); Gretchen McCulloch, Move Over Shakespeare, Teen Girls Are the Real Language Disruptors,
QUARTZ (Aug. 7, 2015), https://qz.com/474671/move-over-shakespeare-teen-girls-are-the-reallanguage-disruptors [https://perma.cc/BM6N-LYTM] (“William Labov[] observed that women
lead 90% of linguistic change—in a paper he wrote 25 years ago. Researchers continue to conﬁrm
his ﬁndings. It takes about a generation for the language patterns started among young women to
jump over to men.”); see also generally Matthew L. Newman et al., Gender Diﬀerences in Language Use:
An Analysis of 14,000 Text Samples, 45 DISCOURSE PROCESSES 211 (2008).
79 See James W. Pennebaker & Laura A. King, Linguistic Styles: Language Use as an Individual
Difference, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1296, 1308 (1999) (using Linguistic Inquiry and Word
Count (“LIWC”) analysis to examine writing done by individuals over the course of years and concluding
that “the ways people express themselves in words are remarkably reliable across time and situations”).
80 See id. (ﬁnding that where study participants wrote about their own emotions, the variation
in their writing styles “predict[ed] such things as illness as well or better than the [traditional] ﬁvefactor [personality] dimensions”); see also, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969)
(evaluating the purported threat in light of its “expressly conditional nature”).
81 See, e.g., Benjamin Bailey, Switching, 9 J. LINGUISTIC ANTHROPOLOGY 241, 242 (1999)
(describing the phenomenon of intentional “code-switching” as a linguistic adjustment to the
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audiences.82 Such adjustments may result from a desire to emphasize certain
aspects of one’s personality, or “self ”;83 to establish rapport with an audience,
whether that audience is a known individual or a group of known individuals84
or a larger audience of online “friends” or “followers”;85 or to demonstrate a
sense of belonging within a certain discourse community.86 These variations
can aﬀect the way in which a message is conveyed: a student who posts a
message on her Facebook page, which she uses to interact with friends her
own age, that she is “dying,” even “literally” so,87 may be best understood as
engaging in hyperbole to convey some strong emotional state, rather than
conveying that she is actually dying or contemplating death.88 But that same
message by the same speaker might be understood diﬀerently in a diﬀerent
context: Posted on a message board for people undergoing cancer treatment
or spoken over the phone to an emergency dispatcher, for example, “I’m
dying” might be better understood as conveying its more literal meaning.
identities of participants in a conversation or in recognition of a setting); Bonnie Urciuoli, Book
Review, 33 LANGUAGE SOC’Y 153, 153, 156 (2004) (reviewing BENJAMIN H. BAILEY, LANGUAGE,
RACE, AND NEGOTIATION OF IDENTITY (2002)) (describing how Dominican-American students’
distinct uses of language with diﬀerent interlocutors contributed to their own identity formation
and how others perceived them).
82 See, e.g., Pavalanathan & Eisenstein, supra note 78, at 189 (“[I]ndividuals modulate their linguistic
performance as they use social media affordances to control the intended audience of their messages.”).
83 See Liam Bullingham & Ana C. Vasconcelos, ‘The Presentation of Self in the Online World’:
Goﬀman and the Study of Online Identities, 39 J. INFO. SCI. 101, 107-08 (2013) (describing how one
woman’s two blogs varied in style, according to their purposes of highlighting the professional and
personal “side[s]” of her personality respectively).
84 See Cristian Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil et al., Mark My Words! Linguistic Style Accommodation
in Social Media, 20 INT’L WORLD WIDE WEB CONF. PROC. 745, 746, 750 (2011) (concluding that in
one-on-one conversations on Twitter, users’ linguistic styles tended to converge and become more
similar to one another’s); see also generally David Jacobson, Interpreting Instant Messaging: Context and
Meaning in Computer-Mediated Communication, 63 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 359 (2007) (describing
the way that shared context can alter how an individual expresses himself to an interlocutor).
85 See Pavalanathan & Eisenstein, supra note 78, at 201-05 (ﬁnding that Twitter users were less
likely to use geographically speciﬁc slang when directing tweets to a wider audience than when
sending messages to a particular user, especially a user from the same geographic area).
86 See Lidsky & Norbut, supra note 7, at 1909-10 (discussing the ways in which speech
conventions vary by age, gender, and profession on the same social media platform).
87 Id. at 1912.
88 See id. at 1912-13 (acknowledging the “generational convention” of teenage hyperbole regarding death
and speculating that it has been caused in part by the performative, audience-driven nature of social media);
Jacobson, supra note 84, at 365 (observing different responses to a subject’s use of the phrase “‘please kill me’
as an exaggeration in a time of stress,” which varied in part based on how well each interlocutor knew the
speaker). Speech about bodily harm or death may be uniquely susceptible to misinterpretation. Understood
literally, such speech reasonably provokes a sense of alarm in hearers; at the same time, some observers suggest
that younger Americans have developed a particularly macabre sense of humor and are more likely to joke
about death than older generations, creating situations rife with potential for misunderstanding. See, e.g.,
Elizabeth Bruenig, Why Is Millennial Humor So Weird?, WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/why-is-millennial-humor-so-weird/2017/08/11/64af9cae-7dd5-11e783c7-5bd5460f0d7e_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9e0f54d8b516 [perma.cc/FHJ9-SZXJ].
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Audience-based misinterpretation can occur on platforms where a dyadic,
or one-on-one, conversation takes place in the view of other observers: for
example, if Facebook user A comments publicly on the public post of another
user, B (as opposed to using the direct, private messaging function), and B
responds with a sub-comment to A’s comment. While this exchange takes place
between A and B, and may be clearly understood by them to operate under the
discursive norms they have already established between the two of them, the
fact remains that the conversation is observable by other Facebook users who
may not know, for instance, that A means “I’m stressed” when he says “Please
kill me.”89 A similar problem of interpretation resulted in a prosecution for
making a terroristic threat when an observer of a Facebook conversation
between two teenagers interpreted one teen’s statements as a threat, rather than
hyperbolic trash talk related to a video game the two played together.90
Jordan Strauss proposes two more criteria, indicative of whether a
communication shows a subjective intent to invoke fear of violence, which
consider a speaker’s relationship to his audience: whether the communication
identifies a specific target and, if so, whether it was reasonably foreseeable that
the communication would reach the target.91 Implicit in the overlap between
these criteria are several gradations of likelihood that the communication
demonstrates subjective intent. A speaker may name a target in a
communication directed, privately or publicly, at that target, or may
communicate the purported threat publicly, not to the target but in a manner
that the target might come across it; finally, he might make a threat at a
particular, individual target but in a manner that makes it unlikely for the
target to ever encounter the threat (for example, a private, direct Facebook
message to a third party).92 Each of these general scenarios encompasses
See Jacobson, supra note 84, at 365.
Lidsky & Norbut, supra note 7, at 1886-88. In that case, after reading a violent statement
that Justin Carter, a teenage boy in Texas, had posted on his public Facebook page, a Canadian
woman tracked down Carter’s address in order to report the post to the police in his locality. Id. at
1886. Carter’s post, which included the phrase “I think I[’m going to] SHOOT UP A
KINDERGARTEN,” had been directed at a friend and was apparently part of an ongoing “war of
words” with a friend, who had “‘trashed’ him ﬁrst.” Id. at 1886-88. The friend to whom the post was
directed did not contact the police. Id. at 1888. Carter spent four months in jail before being released
on bail, and the charges stemming from the arrest were pending for ﬁve years before being dismissed
in exchange for a guilty plea. Id. at 1886-87.
91 Jordan Strauss, Context Is Everything: Towards a More Flexible Rule for Evaluating True Threats
Under the First Amendment, 32 SW. U. L. REV. 231, 264-65, 267-68 (2003).
92 Counter to Strauss’s argument, the analysis should not end if the speaker targets a group. In
such a case, analysis should proceed as to the nature of the group, including whether the group
targeted is a discrete and identiﬁable group and whether the group targeted is geographically or
otherwise accessible to the speaker such that any members hearing the threat might feel targeted.
In some instances the fact that a speaker stops short of identifying a single, discernible individual
target might indicate that the speaker lacks a plan for carrying out any purported threat. But in
other cases, speech targeting a group whose members are relatively small in number, visibly or
89
90
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potentially infinite variations, where under the specific facts at issue the
method of communication results in a greater or lesser likelihood that the
speaker intended to put a target in fear of violence. But these factors are
nonetheless possible to discern in the choices that speakers make in their social
media use, for which lawyers should account in making the case that a
communication does or does not show a subjective intent to make a true threat.
Further evidentiary potential for social media records comes from the fact
that on most platforms, audience responses are recorded and can become
interpretive tools for an original utterance. In other words, a speaker’s intent in
a given social media post can become clear through the responses the
communication attracts and the way the speaker responds to those responses.
If a user on Twitter, for example, publishes a tweet, then receives a response
that appears to misunderstand her intent, she ordinarily has an opportunity to
clarify the intent of her first tweet in a second one, a reply to the response.93
How much evidentiary weight should be attached to the lack of such a clarifying
reply—that is, whether the respondent’s interpretation should be presumed to
be in line with the original speaker’s intent, absent a statement to the
contrary—will likely be a case-specific question that accounts for the user’s
general habits, including how closely monitored the account is, whether the
user regularly replied to interlocutors on the account, and how visible the
interpretive response was to the original speaker. But replies to a post are easily
discoverable and have the potential to explain how a post was understood and
whether the speaker disagreed with that reception,94 and this evidence should
therefore be accounted for in threat prosecutions when available.
C. Accounting for Platform-Based and Technological Constraints
The structural constraints and default settings that determine the form of
expression that can take place on a given social media platform may also
provide evidence of what a user intended her communications on that
otherwise identiﬁable, and located near the speaker may be suﬃciently deﬁnite to support a ﬁnding
that the threat was actually intended to put group members in fear.
93 See, e.g., Shannon Romano, PhD (@sromano23), TWITTER (Nov. 10, 2018, 5:26 AM),
https://twitter.com/sromano23/status/1061248740596559872 [https://perma.cc/H4B3-QYHY] (“Maybe
it was poor word choice. Sorry. Didn’t mean to imply your parent didn’t do a wonderful job raising
you.”); see also T. S. Eliot, The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock, in COLLECTED POEMS 1909–1962, at 7
(1963) (“That is not it at all / That is not what I meant, at all.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
94 See Cinzia Padovani, The Media of the Ultra-Right: Discourse and Audience Activism Online, 15
J. LANGUAGE & POL. 399, 412 (2016) (using the comments posted under a press release by a farright political organization to “decod[e]” the press release by examining, in part, “[w]hat element of
the original message resonated most among the audience”); see also United States v. Dutcher, 851
F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 2017) (using comments from concerned friends to reach the conclusion that a
Facebook post including a threat against President Obama had been taken seriously by observers
who knew the defendant).
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platform to express. For example, Professors Lidsky and Norbut note that a
platform like Twitter, with a relatively low character limit for a single message,
may frustrate a user’s ability to engage in nuanced figurative language like
“sarcasm, hyperbole, or jests”—making misinterpretation of such utterances
more likely.95 But in recent years, Twitter has become more advanced in its
design and allows users to “thread” sequential messages, so that a user who
sends multiple 280-character tweets in a row can ensure that they will appear
in the correct order and appear, at least somewhat, like a paragraph instead of
a series of disjointed thoughts out of context.96 Component tweets of a Twitter
“thread” may still prove more easily taken out of context than any given
sentence in a longer Facebook or blog post, though, given that the entire thread
may not always load all at once.97 Members of the legal community interested
in assessing the contents of a tweet should be aware that the full context of a
tweet may not be available at first glance, and that this may have an effect on
the way a tweet was perceived by relevant parties.
Another platform-speciﬁc feature is the retweet function, also unique to
Twitter. This function, when employed by user A, posts a message originally
tweeted by user B on user A’s account—essentially linking to user B’s message
but in a manner that displays the full content of the link on user A’s page.98
The link’s continued viability depends on user B’s continued decision not to
Lidsky & Norbut, supra note 7, at 1910.
See Aliza Rosen & Ikuhiro Ihara, Giving You More Characters to Express Yourself, TWITTER: BLOG
(Sept. 26, 2017), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/product/2017/Giving-you-more-characters-toexpress-yourself.html [https://perma.cc/D3WH-2Z92] (announcing that the maximum length of a Twitter
post would double, from 140 characters to 280 characters); Help Center: How to Create a Thread on Twitter,
TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/create-a-thread [https://perma.cc/MVC8-BBGD]
(last visited Dec. 19, 2019) (“Sometimes we need more than one Tweet to express ourselves. A thread on
Twitter is a series of connected Tweets from one person. With a thread you can provide additional context,
an update, or an extended point by connecting multiple Tweets together.”); see also Aja Romano, Twitter’s
New Thread Feature Takes Us One Step Closer to Longform Tweeting, VOX (Dec. 15, 2017, 12:10 PM),
https://www.vox.com/culture/2017/12/15/16771922/twitter-new-threading-feature [https://perma.cc/RN3LGXVD] (“The new display should make it much easier to actually read and write threads.”). Some early
research suggests that the increased length of Twitter posts changed the content shared on the site,
improving the “quality of discourse” by allowing room for the development of more nuanced ideas within
a single tweet. Yphtach Lelkes, Kokil Jaidka & Alvin Zhou, Twitter Got Somewhat More Civil When Tweets
Doubled in Length. Here’s How We Know., WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Sept. 17, 2019, 7:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/09/17/twitter-got-somewhat-more-civil-when-tweets-dou
bled-length-heres-how-we-know [https://perma.cc/MP9J-2ZLX].
97 See Romano, supra note 93 (“[W]ith particularly long threads . . . , when you click on the
ﬁrst tweet, Twitter will only display the ﬁrst 200. When you click on the most recent tweet, you can
only see a few tweets back. Lost in the middle are about 75 tweets that are essentially totally
inaccessible.” (emphasis omitted)).
98 See Help Center: Retweet FAQs, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/usingtwitter/retweet-faqs [https://perma.cc/9MBC-4RKQ] (last visited Dec. 18, 2019) (“Retweets look
like normal Tweets with the author’s name and username next to it, but are distinguished by the
Retweet icon . . . and the name of the person who Retweeted the Tweet.” (emphasis omitted)).
95
96
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delete the tweet, though user A may decide to undo the retweet, removing
the link from user A’s proﬁle.99 As Twitter gained popularity, a dispute arose,
especially among people employed by traditional media outlets, regarding
what a retweet “meant.” It is now common to see a phrase along the lines of
“Retweets do not signal endorsement” on journalists’ proﬁles, indicating that
anyone viewing their tweets should not presume that they agree with,
endorse, or vouch for the truth of any tweets from others to which they have
linked on their own proﬁles.100 In at least one legal context, a Twitter user has
been held personally responsible for the content of another user’s tweet,
which she retweeted.101 And somewhat surprisingly, a prosecution for a true
threat under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) was allowed to proceed on evidence that the
defendant had retweeted threatening messages.102 While this prosecution was
arguably inﬂuenced by other factors and this conclusion may not be
generalizable,103 the conclusion reached by the magistrate judge in that case
should nevertheless give observers pause. The prospect of prosecution for a

99 Id.
100 See

Charlie Warzel, Meet the Man Behind Twitter’s Most Infamous Phrase, BUZZFEED (Apr.
15, 2014, 2:51 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/charliewarzel/meet-the-man-behindtwitters-most-infamous-phrase [https://perma.cc/2G76-MWDW] (interviewing an early adopter of
the disclaimer, who explained that he “wanted to be clear that a retweet did not necessarily indicate
agreement. Nor did it mean [he] was conﬁrming what another news organization was reporting.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
101 Callum Borchers, Retweets ≠ Endorsements? Oh, Yes, They Do, Say the Hatch Act Police, WASH.
POST: THE FIX (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/10/04/retweetsendorsements-hatch-act/?utm_term=.8f6309cb6ffb [https://perma.cc/NZM7-WTA2] (describing the
decision of the United States Office of Special Counsel to issue a warning to United Nations Ambassador
Nikki Haley, whose retweet of a tweet supporting a candidate for political office was interpreted as an
endorsement of the candidate in violation of the Hatch Act).
102 See United States v. Yassin, No. 16-03024-01, 2017 WL 1324141, at *4-5 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 23, 2017)
(report and recommendation of magistrate judge), adopted by No. 16-3024-01 (Apr. 6, 2017) (rejecting
the defendant’s argument that because the retweeted threats did not consist of “her words, . . . as a
matter of law, it [could not] be alleged that she made threats”). The discussion of subjective intent in
this opinion was unnecessary, as the Eighth Circuit applies a reasonable-listener test to true threat
prosecutions, but nonetheless took a strong position that a user who retweets a threatening
communication “intends to convey the message that she agrees with the ‘tweet.’” Id. at *5 (quoting
Bethany C. Stein, Comment, A Bland Interpretation: Why a Facebook “Like” Should Be Protected First
Amendment Speech, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 1255, 1277 (2014)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
103 See, e.g., Katie Zavadski, The American Anti-Vaccine Mom Turned ISIS Superstar, DAILY BEAST
(July 12, 2017, 6:54 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-american-anti-vaccine-mom-turned-isissuperstar [https://perma.cc/4W9G-4CVL] (describing Yassin’s alleged ties to the Islamic State and
noting that in addition to retweeting other ISIS-affiliated users’ threats, she was alleged to have
“produce[d] . . . original content” including sharing photos and addresses of U.S. military personnel);
see also generally U.N. Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Threat Posed by ISIL (Da’esh)
to International Peace and Security and the Range of United Nations Efforts in Support of Member States in
Countering the Threat ¶¶ 4-34, U.N. Doc. S/2016/92 (Jan. 29, 2016) (describing the international
community’s assessment of the threats posed by the Islamic State in 2016 and highlighting the role of
online social media in the organization’s efforts to recruit international support).
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retweet—when it is arguably unsettled what the “meaning” of a retweet is,104
and thus a defendant could have intended the action of retweeting to mean
something entirely diﬀerent than a full-throated endorsement of the original
tweet’s message—would seem to leave too much discretion in the hands of
individual members of the judicial branch. Such discretion, exercised without
more precise guidance from experts and without systemic guidance from the
Supreme Court, is likely to replicate the systemic biases of other parts of
society, which can be mediated through and even exacerbated by language
diﬀerences.105 This result would undermine the promise of the First
Amendment, as well as the Constitution’s equal protection and due process
guarantees, and should be guarded against in the development of the true
threat doctrine and its application to speech on the Internet.
Other relevant features of specific platforms include the disappearingphoto feature on platforms like Snapchat.106 As Lidsky and Romano note, the
fact that a photo message is visible for only a limited period of time could make
any threat sent over Snapchat either “more or less ominous.”107 They also note
the evidentiary problems inherent in proving a threat sent over Snapchat:
because the message disappears once viewed, investigators looking into a
perceived threat have to rely on the memory of the participant, which may be
unreliable in the immediate aftermath due to the viewer’s emotional response—
perhaps a response that is outsized in comparison to the emotional reaction the
speaker intended or anticipated producing.108 If a Snapchat message is
recovered109—a process which takes a considerable amount of time110—the very
fact that the sender used Snapchat, or a similar time-limited messaging service,
could support a claim that the sender intended to threaten the recipient. The

104 See John Dickerson, What RTs Mean, JOHN DICKERSON, https://johndickerson.com/blog/whatrts-mean [https://perma.cc/9Y7W-NFAV] (last visited Jan. 9, 2019) (providing one Twitter user’s
explanation of several such possible “meanings” he intends to convey by retweeting another user’s tweet).
105 See, e.g., Brief of Michael Render (“Killer Mike”) et al., supra note 65, at 19-23 (describing
social science research demonstrating the eﬀect of an association with rap music on potential jurors’
perception of a defendant); John Eligon, Speaking Black Dialect in Courtrooms Can Have Striking
Consequences, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/25/us/black-dialectcourtrooms.html [https://perma.cc/6LA4-DE6C] (describing a signiﬁcantly higher rate of
transcription errors in courtroom testimony given with African-American English grammar and
vocabulary compared to testimony given in standard American English).
106 Lidsky & Norbut, supra note 7, at 1910.
107 Id.
108 Id.; see also supra notes 61–68 and accompanying text (explaining the need for a subjectiveintent requirement as a safe harbor for expression that unintentionally crosses a line into threatening).
109 Although a photo or message sent through Snapchat disappears from the recipient’s inbox
once it has been viewed, in some cases content is retained on Snapchat’s servers for up to thirty days
and can be made available to law enforcement agencies. SNAP LAW ENFORCEMENT GUIDE, supra
note 59, at 4, 9-10.
110 Lidsky & Norbut, supra note 7, at 1911.
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sender’s choice of medium could be cited to argue that the sender knew that
the message’s content was illicit or otherwise desired to evade detection.
More generally, factﬁnders should take into account the range of options
available to a speaker on a given platform. On a platform that does not allow
for traditional forms of textual emphasis like bolding or underlining, a user’s
choice to use all-capitalized text for emphasis may look less threatening than
it would in another context.111 Where a Snapchat user had the option to use a
“neutral yellow” version of the emoji that shows a man running, but instead
chose a version of the emoji with dark brown skin, it may be reasonable for a
jury to draw inferences from that choice as to the user’s intent.112 Evaluation
of these choices requires further research, and may raise even more questions:
Such choices by users may be weighted diﬀerently depending on other
evidence, such as whether the user was aware of the full complement of
choices the platform oﬀered.113 Additionally, departure from a default
formatting choice may be appropriately weighted as more demonstrative of a
user’s intent than using the default formatting option.114 But where this
111 Compare Paul Lukas, All-Caps Typography Is Doomed, NEW REPUBLIC (June 23, 2013),
https://newrepublic.com/article/113578/using-all-caps-worst-form-emphasis [https://perma.cc/EQ9JB3T3] (“The standard criticism is that using all-caps is akin to shouting.”), with u/Voyager5589, How
Do We Still Not Have Italics in iMessage?, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/
r/apple/comments/8d71xp/how_do_we_still_not_have_italics_in_imessage [https://perma.cc/HB4A4A2V] (last visited Nov. 15, 2019) (lamenting that in the absence of other forms of emphasis, users of
the iMessage messaging platform are “left with just using all caps”); see also Gretchen McCulloch, The
Meaning of All Caps—in Texting and in Life, WIRED (July 23, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/
story/all-caps-because-internet-gretchen-mcculloch [https://perma.cc/28N3-5ZGB] (“Typewriters
and early computer terminals . . . wouldn’t let you type italics and underlines or change font sizes (for
that matter, many social media sites still don’t). This created a vacuum into which the preexisting but
relatively uncommon shouty caps expanded.”).
112 Geneus, supra note 7, at 451.
113 It is not implausible that a software update could add new default settings to a
communication platform without making users aware. See, e.g., John Patrick Pullen, The Ultimate
Guide to Apple’s New Messages App, TIME (Oct. 18, 2016), http://time.com/4534887/apple-messagesimessage-tips-tricks/ [https://perma.cc/9RVL-748T] (noting that iPhone users might have noticed
“a surprise or two” in the text messages they sent after updating to a new version of the iPhone
operating system, including messages automatically accompanied by “a burst of confetti,” and
explaining this and other new features to users who were not otherwise made aware of them). In
fact, in researching this topic in the spring of 2019, this author learned for the ﬁrst time of several
extratextual features her iPhone has been capable of executing since 2016.
114 Take the example of using an emoji of a running human, and the choice to use a version of
that emoji with dark brown skin rather than either the “neutral yellow” emoji or any other of “various
shades of white and brown.” See Geneus, supra note 7, at 431-32, 451 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Choosing an emoji with any of the more realistic skin tones requires an additional step in
the typing process, where the cartoonish yellow emojis are made the default choice. Matt Klein, How
to Change Emoji Skin Tones on iPhone and OS X, HOW-TO GEEK (June 30, 2016, 12:34 PM),
https://www.howtogeek.com/260800/how-to-change-emoji-skin-tones-on-iphone-and-os-x [https://
perma.cc/JE9D-4LKA]; see also Zara Rahman, The Problem with Emoji Skin Tones That No One Talks
About, DAILY DOT (Dec. 18, 2018, 5:50 AM), https://www.dailydot.com/irl/skin-tone-emoji
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information may add further context and further elucidate the reasons behind
a user’s expressive social media content, it should also be considered as
relevant to determining her subjective intent in disseminating that content.
IV. THE NEED FOR SPECIFICITY IN PROSECUTING TRUE THREATS
Lower courts’ attempts to apply subjective-intent requirements to
Internet statements, whether related to charges brought under § 875(c) after
Elonis or under other statutes, so far reveal a lack of preparation for the charge
of fully weighing evidence about a defendant’s subjective intent.
A. Elonis on Remand
On remand from the Supreme Court, following the Court’s
announcement that 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) encompassed a subjective-intent
requirement, the Third Circuit in United States v. Elonis reviewed the record
again to consider whether its prior application of the statute was nevertheless
harmless.115 The court assessed the evidence adduced at Elonis’s trial, in light
of the jury instruction prescribed by the Supreme Court: that the jury could
convict if it found that Elonis “transmit[ted] a communication for the
purpose of issuing a threat, or with knowledge that the communication
w[ould] be viewed as a threat.”116 Any error would be harmless if a jury
properly instructed under the new standard could nevertheless have found
Elonis guilty, because the facts shown at trial established Elonis’s subjective
intent such that no rational jury could ﬁnd that Elonis had committed the
relevant acts without also ﬁnding the required mens rea.117
The Third Circuit decided that under either a knowledge or recklessness
standard, a jury faced with the evidence presented at Elonis’s trial would have
convicted him on each of four counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).118 The first
of these counts was based on threatening statements directed at Elonis’s exwife, which he made on Facebook over the course of slightly more than a
month.119 In concluding that no rational juror would have believed Elonis had
he testified to a lack of knowledge or intent that his posts would make his exwife feel threatened, the court relied on the “graphic nature” of the messages,
[https://perma.cc/62ZT-2LS4] (discussing some of the reasons a user might choose an emoji of a
particular skin color and how such choices can affect the message received by the sender’s audience).
115 841 F.3d 589, 597-601 (3d. Cir. 2016).
116 Id. at 596 (quoting United States v. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012 (2015)).
117 Id. at 598. The Third Circuit cited Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in Elonis as the impetus
for its consideration of harmless error on remand. Id. at 596 (citing Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2018 (Alito,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
118 Id. at 598.
119 Id.
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reproducing the text of the posts in full.120 But the court also referred to
developments in the real world between the two posts, specifically that Elonis’s
ex-wife sought a restraining order after his first allegedly threatening approach,
and that he continued to post similar messages after a restraining order was
issued against him—including one referencing the restraining order.121 The
court found that Elonis’s decision to continue with similar posts following the
restraining order made it “less credible still” that he had disseminated the post
without either the purpose or knowledge that his ex-wife would interpret the
posts as threats—and that “[n]o rational juror could conclude otherwise.”122
Similarly, in aﬃrming Elonis’s conviction on another count, for
threatening to injure employees of the Pennsylvania State Police and a county
sheriﬀ ’s department, the court quoted language from Elonis’s posts that gave
rise to the indictment.123 It held that Elonis’s experience with the threats he
had made about his ex-wife—and other, previous threats made on Facebook
toward former co-workers that had resulted in his termination—made it more
likely that a jury would ﬁnd that Elonis knew that a reasonable person could
interpret these posts, too, as threats.124 In so concluding, the court rejected
Elonis’s arguments that the form of his posts—rap lyrics—and the forum
through which he posted them—Facebook, which he argued was “a medium
that magniﬁes the potential for disconnect between the speaker’s intent and
the audience’s understanding”—would have allowed a jury to ﬁnd that Elonis
did not know that his posts would be taken as threats.125 Because Elonis had
already seen the eﬀect that earlier lyrical Facebook posts had on his ex-wife,
and had witnessed the consequences of those posts in the form of a restraining
order issued against him, the court concluded that Elonis was “clearly aware”
of how his audience would interpret this subsequent post.126

Id. at 593-94, 599.
Id. at 598.
Id. at 599.
Id. at 599-600.
Id. at 600.
Id.
Id. The court also found that the language Elonis used in this later threat against law
enforcement oﬃcials was “[i]f anything, . . . more explicit” than those that had resulted in his
termination and the restraining order. Id. at 599. The court did not explain this conclusion in further
detail, but it would seem to contradict the paradigmatic reasoning in Watts that a conditional
statement is less objectively threatening than a statement not couched in conditional terms. See id.
(“Despite that, he posted yet another violent message stating his intention to detonate explosives
near State Police oﬃcers and the Sheriﬀ ’s Department if ‘worse comes to worse.’”); cf. Watts v.
United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (“We agree with petitioner that his only oﬀense here was ‘a
kind of very crude oﬀensive method of stating a political opposition to the President.’ Taken in
context, and regarding the expressly conditional nature of the statement and the reaction of the
listeners, we do not see how it could be interpreted otherwise.”).
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
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As to the third count of violating § 875(c), which charged Elonis with
communicating a threat to injure a kindergarten class of elementary school
children, the court relied solely on the language Elonis used and the context
of the statement.127 The court found Elonis’s language “graphic and speciﬁc”
and “narrow[ed] . . . to kindergarten classes”; in particular, the court was
troubled by the post’s conclusion, a “haunting question that suggests he will
carry out his threat imminently.”128 The court then assessed that post in the
context of “the understandable sensitivity regarding school shootings in this
country,” of which it assumed without evidence Elonis had some awareness.129
On the fourth count of violating § 875(c), the court returned to relying on
Elonis’s prior experiences with his Facebook posts as “overwhelming[]”
evidence that Elonis knew how his post that purportedly threatened an FBI
agent would be interpreted.130
The Elonis remand decision, therefore, shows a court that engages
inconsistently with the types of social media evidence outlined in Part III.
On the majority of the counts it reviewed, the court looked to the real-world
responses to Elonis’s posts, ranging from the grant of a protective order
against him to a visit from FBI agents, to demonstrate that it would have
been impossible for Elonis not to know that his similar, subsequent Facebook
posts could be viewed as threats.131 This conclusion relies on similar reasoning
to my suggestion that subsequent comments provide an interpretive frame
for a post.132 It arguably makes an even stronger showing to the same end.
Where a person making a Facebook post might not see subsequent comments
on that post,133 Elonis was visited by oﬃcers in person and therefore could
not claim that he was not on notice of the reactions to his lyrical threats.134
This overwhelming evidence based on real-world interactions outweighed the
persuasive weight of Elonis’s platform-based argument about the uncertain
nature of Facebook posts and his context-based argument about the uncertain
status of threatening statements made in rap music.135 Because he had
previously made similar statements on the same platform using a similar
Elonis, 841 F.3d at 600.
Id. The court reproduced the post at issue in its entirety before this analysis, and it follows here:
“That’s it, I’ve had about enough / I’m checking out and making a name for myself / Enough elementary
schools in a ten mile radius to initiate the most heinous school shooting ever imagined / And hell hath
no fury like a crazy man in a kindergarten class / The only question is . . . which one?” Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 600-01. Though the court again reproduced the relevant text in full, its analysis did
not elaborate at all on the import of the language or format of the post.
131 See supra notes 119–126 and accompanying text (outlining the court’s findings on these grounds).
132 See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text (discussing the way responses clarify the
meaning of an original post).
133 See supra text accompanying notes 93–94.
134 Elonis, 841 F.3d at 600.
135 Id.
127
128
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lyrical form, and had received feedback that members of his social circle found
posts phrased in that manner threatening, a reasonable jury could have found
that he acted with knowledge that similar reactions would result from his
similar, subsequent statements.
The decision on remand falls short of persuasive, however, in its
reexamination of the count charging Elonis with threatening to injure a class
of kindergartners. The decision mentions the “graphic nature” of Elonis’s
language and the “haunting question” with which the post ends, but goes no
further in articulating what evidentiary value this language could have to a
jury determining whether Elonis knew or intended the post to be a threat.136
It is not enough under a subjective standard to simply identify the nature of
the language in a social media threat. At most, a judge’s pronouncement that
a post contains “graphic” language speaks to the perception of a reasonable
observer—eﬀectively duplicating the objective-intent standard, reading the
speciﬁc, necessary protections of a subjective-intent requirement out of the
true-threat analysis.137 As mentioned above, there is no evidence that
deﬁnitively links any speciﬁc word or phrasing choice to a speciﬁc mental
state; however, courts should require some reasoning in accepting a
prosecutor’s contention that a defendant’s use of a word or phrase is probative
as to that individual defendant’s state of mind.
B. Other Courts’ Application of Subjective-Intent Standards
In the limited number of other cases where courts have considered alleged
threats made via social media under a subjective-intent standard, they have
approached social media evidence much like the Third Circuit in its decision
in Elonis on remand. Courts familiar with principles of notice and fair
warning are almost universally comfortable with assessing when a defendant’s
prior conduct, particularly his prior online speech and the reactions of others
to that speech, should have warned him that similar speech acts would be
received by audiences as threatening. In United States v. Dutcher, a defendant
who announced on his Facebook page his intent to travel to a nearby town
where the President was scheduled to speak and assassinate the President was
convicted under a subjective-intent standard.138 His conviction was upheld in
part because, rather than recanting the threatening statement when Facebook
friends commented, expressing worry and urging him to “[s]tay calm,” the
defendant continued to post Facebook updates in a similar vein.139 Although
Supra text accompanying notes 128–130.
See supra notes 81–88, 93–94 & 105 (describing how diﬀerent social groups use language
diﬀerently, including using the same phrase or action to mean diﬀerent things).
138 851 F.3d 757, 760-61 (7th Cir. 2017).
139 Id. at 762.
136
137
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the commenters’ expressions of alarm in Dutcher were not so severe a reaction
as the law-enforcement responses in Elonis, where the FBI monitored the
Elonis’s Facebook account and visited him at his house,140 the comments on
the defendant’s posts in Dutcher were nevertheless suﬃciently clear in
demonstrating alarm that the defendant’s subsequent posts could be
considered knowing.141
Even in conducting this relatively familiar analysis, though, some courts
are unclear as to the function of evidence of an audience’s reaction,142 which
can be admitted in diﬀerent contexts to demonstrate both objective and
subjective components of a true threat.143 In integrating the more novel
Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2006 (2015).
Dutcher, 851 F.3d at 762; see also State v. Taupier, 193 A.3d 1, 25 (Conn. 2018) (“[I]f the
defendant had been unaware when he sent the first e-mail that it would be interpreted as a serious
threat, he would have reacted quite differently to [his acquaintance’s] characterization of the e-mail
as ‘disturbing’ and his admonition to the defendant to refrain from making such statements.”). But see
People v. Khan, 127 N.E.3d 592 (Ill. Ct. App. 2018). In the Khan case, the prosecution relied on the
fact that the defendant, like Elonis, had previously been visited by police investigating threatening
statements he had made online. Id. at 595. Both posts reported as threatening were made on Facebook,
and the fact that police had interviewed the defendant after a 2010 post could reasonably have called
into question the defendant’s credibility in insisting, in 2013, that “[e]veryone knows if you post
something on Facebook it’s a joke.” Id. at 595-96. But in upholding the conviction, the Illinois
Appellate Court did not refer to this evidence of past conduct in its analysis. See id. at 603. Instead it
relied on the content of the defendant’s message, “which told people that he came to school every day
with a gun and was going to use it on somebody,” the fact that fear was a foreseeable consequence of
posting such a message from an anonymous Facebook account, and holding that juries were entitled
to infer that the defendant “intended the natural and probable consequences of his act.” Id.
142 Compare Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146, 1159-60 (Pa. 2018) (relying heavily on the
reactions of the police oﬃcers named in an allegedly threatening rap song once they had discovered
the song), with United States v. LaFontaine, No. 15-77, 2015 WL 5999834, at *3 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 14,
2015) (excluding on relevancy grounds evidence showing how recipients had responded to the
defendant’s phone calls, on the basis that “[a] recipient’s reaction to an alleged threat is not relevant
to the charge of communicating threats” after Elonis).
143 As Elonis and Dutcher demonstrate, evidence of an audience’s reaction to prior purported
threats can be highly relevant as to a defendant’s subjective intent in making subsequent statements
understood as threats. See supra notes 121–126, 131–135, 138–141, and accompanying text. But an
audience reaction that follows a threat can only be relevant to whether a reasonable observer would
ﬁnd the defendant’s statement threatening, as persuasive evidence that at least some people did (or
did not) ﬁnd the statement to articulate a threat. To ﬁnd the latter type of reaction evidence relevant
to a defendant’s subjective intent would assume that a defendant can anticipate with a high degree
of accuracy her audience’s eventual responses. But to exclude the former type of reaction evidence
(or its absence, as the case may be) could prevent a defendant from demonstrating that similar past
statements had given her no reason to know that certain language or expressions could be interpreted
as threatening. Cf. United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Nobody who
read the message board postings, however, knew that he had a .50 caliber gun or that he would send
the later emails. Neither of these facts could therefore, under an objective test, ‘have a bearing on
whether [Bagdasarian’s] statements might reasonably be interpreted as a threat’ by a reasonable
person in the position of those who saw his postings . . . .” (quoting United States v. Parr, 545 F.3d
491, 502 (7th Cir. 2008))). The lack of clarity in the standard regarding audience reaction evidence
can inhibit defendants from making their strongest cases, either way.
140
141
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features of Internet communication in their analysis of subjective intent,
courts are even more inconsistent. The fact that a speaker may know
concretely which individuals make up his online audience, based on the
privacy settings applied to his social media accounts, can be a potent tool for
discovering whether a defendant intended his online message to reach an
individual named in the message—or indeed, whether he intended his
message to reach anyone at all.144 In United States v. Wheeler, the Tenth Circuit
overturned a conviction because the defendant had testiﬁed credibly that he
thought he had removed all of his Facebook “friends,” rendering his proﬁle
completely private, before posting messages “urging his ‘religious followers’
to ‘kill cops.’”145 Wheeler, then, stands clearly for the proposition that under a
subjective standard, a threat made by a defendant who believes he has no
audience at all cannot be a punishable true threat.
But where a defendant has posted a message in a forum where she knows
that someone might see it, courts’ approaches vary widely. In United States v.
Stock, the Third Circuit assumed without explanation that an anonymous
message posted on the website “Craig’s List,” identifying a target by only his
initials and his profession, could constitute a true threat.146 This is not a selfevident conclusion: “Craig’s List” (or “Craigslist”) is not a social media
platform like Facebook or Twitter, in which users create stable proﬁles and
receive notiﬁcations when other users interact with those proﬁles or
associated content.147 Instead, Craigslist functions more like an online
classiﬁed ads section, where users post standalone advertisements seeking or
oﬀering furniture, housing, or companionship,148 or simply expressing
themselves;149 any communication takes place oﬀ the site through users’
existing communication channels.150 Additionally, “[p]eople usually only go
to Craigslist when they want something speciﬁc,”151 as opposed to a social
networking site which a user might check daily. The court in Stock considered
none of these distinctions, apparently ﬁnding irrelevant to the intent element
144 See supra text accompanying notes 89–90 (highlighting the potential for misunderstanding
when unintended audiences see a post without understanding its conversational context).
145 776 F.3d 736, 738-39, 741 (10th Cir. 2015).
146 728 F.3d 287, 299 (3d Cir. 2013).
147 See Josh Constine, Facebook Launches Marketplace, a Friendlier Craigslist, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 3,
2016, 8:01 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2016/10/03/facebook-marketplace-2 [https://perma.cc/2HYXWVHS] (contrasting the then-new Facebook Marketplace, an online buy-sell forum associated with
users’ Facebook accounts, with the anonymous, “dead-simple” Craigslist platform).
148 See generally Philadelphia, CRAIGSLIST, https://philadelphia.craigslist.org [https://perma.cc/PN4424H6] (last visited Dec. 17, 2019).
149 See, e.g., Rants and Raves, CRAIGSLIST, https://philadelphia.craigslist.org/d/rants-raves/search/rnr
[https://perma.cc/6NKT-HDXG] (last visited Dec. 17, 2019).
150 How to Reply to Craigslist Postings, CRAIGSLIST, https://www.craigslist.org/about/help/
replying_to_posts [https://perma.cc/GL4F-SCN2] (last visited Dec. 17, 2019).
151 Constine, supra note 147.
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whether the defendant anticipated that his target would ever visit Craigslist
and discover the message.152 Taking the opposite approach, the Sixth Circuit
in United States v. Jeﬀries looked to the defendant’s distribution of his music
video with messages like “[g]ive this to the judge for court,” taking this
statement of intent that the video reach the judge as part of a “single
communication” with the video itself.153
In drawing conclusions from the speciﬁc language a defendant used,
several courts take the approach taken by the Third Circuit in the remanded
Elonis decision in concluding, essentially, that the language was received as
threatening and it was therefore intended as a threat.154 In Knox, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court drew a comparison to Watts in noting that the
language of the statements at issue was “mostly unconditional,” but did not
go further to explain how the nonconditional statements actually
demonstrated an intent that they be interpreted as threats.155 In D.C. v. R.R.,
a civil suit involving high school students, a California court directly quoted
the language of the posts at issue and concluded that the “message [was]
unequivocal” in its “serious expression of intent to inﬂict bodily harm,”
“conveyed no less than three times by the phrases ‘rip out your fucking heart,’
‘want[] to kill you,’ and ‘pound your head in with an ice pick.’”156 Over the
defendant’s contention that he had been “in a playful mood” when he posted
the messages and intended them as a joke, the court concluded that on the
face of the posts there was no “jocular intent”; instead, “[a]n intent to harm
[was] evident.”157 This tautological approach to the subjective-intent standard
See generally United States v. Stock, 728 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2013).
692 F.3d 473, 482 (6th Cir. 2012); see also Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146, 1160 (Pa.
2018) (concluding that although the defendant had not sent the allegedly threatening song directly to
the police officers named in it, this did not preclude the defendant from having intended the officers
to hear it); cf. United States v. Patillo, 431 F.2d 293, 297 (4th Cir. 1970) (requiring a heightened
showing of imminent harm where a threat to the President is “uttered without communication to the
President intended,” because the rationale behind punishing such threats is not implicated when the
President neither learns of the threat nor is put in imminent danger because of it).
154 See supra text accompanying notes 138–139.
155 Knox, 190 A.3d at 1159-60.
156 182 Cal. App. 4th 1190, 1219 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
157 Id. at 1206, 1220-21. The opinion in D.C. v. R.R. also assumed without any apposite
supporting facts that the defendant had “composed” the statements at issue “over a period of at least
several minutes,” concluding on this basis that “the content of the message and its transmission
show[ed] deliberation on the part of the author.” Id. at 1219. When the Ninth Circuit came to a
similar conclusion regarding the weight of the speech in Bagdasarian, it did so on the basis of speciﬁc
ﬁndings that demonstrated that the defendant had continued to monitor reactions to his speech—
and that he subsequently took up the same conversation weeks later. United States v. Bagdasarian,
652 F.3d 1113, 1130 (9th Cir. 2011). Without such speciﬁc ﬁndings, the court in D.C. relied only on
its own assumptions about Internet use, without evidence and contrary to the views of other courts
in similar contexts, which come to the conclusion that the process behind posting online speech is
less deliberative and more casual than speech in other mediums. D.C., 182 Cal. App. 4th at 1219. But
see, e.g., SI03, Inc. v. Bodybuilding.com, LLC, No. 07-6311, 2008 WL 11348459, at *5 (D. Idaho Dec.
152
153
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is not universal: other courts conduct more thorough analyses of defendants’
speciﬁc uses of language in context, providing reasoning for the conclusions
about subjective intent they then draw.158 But the fact that this intensive
context-based intent analysis is applied selectively—or at the very least,
inconsistently—poses a problem for the vindication of First Amendment
rights of defendants whose speech may be aﬀorded greater First Amendment
protection based on either their own identities or the identities of the judges
who hear their cases.
V. ADMITTING MORE CONTEXTUAL EVIDENCE TO FACILITATE
MORE ACCURATE DETERMINATIONS OF INTENT
In order to improve their analyses of defendants’ subjective intents, courts
should be encouraged to interpret relevance rules liberally and admit more
social media evidence. In the examples of reasoning from evidence discussed
above, the social media evidence courts failed to consider was generally of the
sort that, if admitted, would have been helpful to the defendant in providing
more context. Especially in the early days of prosecutions under subjectiveintent standards, and in light of the evidence in this Comment that courts
have not yet fully appreciated the probative eﬀects of contextual evidence,
courts should err on the side of speech protection in admitting contextual
evidence. The associated risks of confusion and delay are not insubstantial,
but even a temporary period of over-admitting contextual evidence would
provide appellate courts with the opportunity to observe outcomes and
provide guidance for lower courts applying the new standard.
The argument for adopting a liberal posture toward the admission of
contextual evidence is further supported by the principle that intent is a
question of fact, best resolved by juries.159 Even where judges are the primary
23, 2008) (“Internet blogs, message boards, and chat rooms are, by their nature, typically casual
expressions of opinion.”).
158 See, e.g., State v. Carroll, 196 A.3d 106, 121 (N.J. Super. 2018) (concluding in the absence of
any speciﬁc threatening language that the defendant had merely “expressed disdain” for the party
named in her posts and instructing the prosecution that a conviction would require showing that
speciﬁc “cohorts or allies of [the] defendant would understand her expression of hope [that someone
“‘blow’ the[] glasses . . . oﬀ his face”] as a request or command and would act on it; and that [the]
defendant intended that reaction”); see also Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1121 (concluding that the context
of the defendant’s statements about the President, on a ﬁnancial news message board, “blunt[ed]
any perception that statements made there were serious expressions of intended violence”).
159 See United States v. Yassin, No. 16-03024-01, 2017 WL 1324141, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 23,
2017) (report and recommendation of magistrate judge), adopted by No. 16-3024-01 (Apr. 6, 2017)
(“[T]he question of whether the allegations . . . constitute a true threat is a question reserved for
the jury and thus would seem premature at [the motion to dismiss] stage . . . .”); accord Universal
Calvary Church v. City of New York, No. 96-4606-99, 2000 WL 1538019, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17,
2000) (“The question of intent is a question of fact for the jury.” (citing Casimir v. Hoﬀman, 213
N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961))).
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arbiters on the question of intent, more evidence can only contribute to
better-informed decisions. Whether a judge or jury will make the ultimate
ﬁndings of fact, though, judges must also be careful to emphasize the
analytical distinction between the evidence that supports the subjectiveintent ﬁnding and evidence that demonstrates how an observer would have
reacted.160 A clear delineation between these separate ﬁndings is necessary:
if factﬁnders are not clearly instructed on these standards, the reasonableobserver evidence may elide into evidence of what the individual speaker
actually intended, reinstating the underprotective, tautological reasoning
identiﬁed as problematic in Part IV.161
As an alternative, Professors Lidsky and Norbut have proposed the
creation of an aﬃrmative defense for context, which in their explanation
would allow defendants, who are in the best position to know what context
will be helpful in persuading juries that they lacked intent, to best rebut a
prosecution’s showing of intent to threaten.162 Along with this defense, they
would add a preliminary hearing before the trial judge where a defendant
could present his contextual evidence and might get an indictment dismissed
quickly if the context reveals that he did not intend to make a threat.163 But
together, these proposals eliminate the protective elements of criminal
procedure without oﬀering defendants much in return. First, intent is an
element of any statute criminalizing threats, so while defendants may be in
the best position to produce this evidence, the burden to persuade on the issue
of intent properly belongs with the prosecution. And second, there is no
reason to expect that a pretrial hearing on subjective intent will be resolved
in the defendant’s favor any more often than the post-trial and remanded
decisions evaluated in Part IV. Instead of providing defendants with an early
opportunity to vindicate their rights, then, this procedure could become just
one more procedural hurdle to clear before a defendant can make her case to
a jury, the members of which are somewhat more likely to be of her peer
group than the average judge.164 Instead, making clear that contextual
160 See, e.g., supra note 143 (explaining that evidence of audience reaction can be relevant to
both standards, depending on the sequence of events at issue).
161 Recent Case, First Amendment—True Threat Doctrine—Pennsylvania Supreme Court Finds Rap
Song a True Threat—Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146 (Pa. 2018), 132 HARV. L. REV. 1558, 1564
(2019) (“In using the listeners’ reactions to Knox’s speech to discern Knox’s subjective intent, the court
rendered its insistence on finding specific [i.e., subjective] intent meaningless. . . . The emphasis in
Knox on the listeners’ fearful reactions . . . vitiated the subjective prong of the inquiry.” (internal
footnote omitted)). But see supra note 143 and accompanying text (positing that a properly framed
investigation of listener reactions can serve as evidence of a speaker’s intent in subsequent statements).
162 Lidsky & Norbut, supra note 7, at 1925-26.
163 Id.
164 Compare Shannon Greenwood, Andrew Perrin & Maeve Duggan, Social Media Update
2016, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.pewinternet.org/2016/11/11/social-
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evidence is relevant to the issue of intent, but leaving the burden of proving
intent with the prosecution and the ultimate decision to a jury whenever
practicable, will provide more consistent and more conceptually coherent
protection for defendants who made threatening statements without the
requisite intent under a properly recalibrated true threats doctrine.
Neither the minimal adjustments proposed here nor the more signiﬁcant
shift outlined above, to a recognition that the First Amendment requires
subjective intent to be a necessary element of a threat conviction, is likely to
be outcome-determinative in a signiﬁcant number of cases. In Elonis, for
example, even under the stringent examination of contextual evidence and
evaluation of subjective intent I propose, there appears to be suﬃcient
evidence to convict the defendant of at least two counts of violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 875(c). But the best argument for announcing a clear, uniform standard in
this context is not that it oﬀers any individual defendant a greater chance of
acquittal. Instead, there is additional systemic value in requiring prosecutors,
juries, and judges to rely on evidentiarily based, logically relevant evidence,
and to give accurate, non-pretextual reasons, when they argue for and impose
punishments for speech. Instead of appealing to jurors’ own biases as to
which, if any, words are beyond the pale in polite society, prosecutors and
defenders should be given incentives to draw on social media archives, where
available, and craft arguments about subjective intent that rely on how a
defendant has spoken in the past, how his interlocutors have responded, and
what kinds of communicative media have been accessible to him—in order to
show what he actually knew and meant to say. Requiring such analytical
clarity in prosecutions for speech would be a step in the direction of ensuring
that speech is not punished for its bad eﬀects or based on potentially biased
conjecture about a speaker’s mental state, but only where a speaker
demonstrably intended to cause harm and actually did so.

media-update-2016/ [https://perma.cc/Q6K5-CNNC], with Age and Experience of Judges, FED.
JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/exhibits/graphs-and-maps/age-and-experience-judges
[https://perma.cc/ 8KLK-WBHX] (last visited Dec. 18, 2019). Of course, age is not the only
factor that determines a person’s knowledge and patterns of usage of the Internet and social
media. See, e.g., Nicole Zillien & Eszter Hargittai, Digital Distinction: Status-Specific Types of
Internet Usage, 90 SOC. SCI. Q. 274, 287 (2009) (finding that “social status is significantly related
to various types of capital-enhancing uses of the Internet, suggesting that those already in more
privileged positions are reaping the benefits of their time spent online more than users from
lower socioeconomic backgrounds”). But on most relevant axes, a multi-member jury will be more
representative of the general population than an individual judge.
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CONCLUSION
The true threat doctrine has developed for over a decade without an adequate
review of its operation within the context of the First Amendment. In that time,
states and federal jurisdictions have adopted a variety of approaches to filling in
the gap left by the Supreme Court’s decisions as to what intent the Constitution
requires. Judges at all levels have also been left without authoritative guidance as
to the added complications of applying the less-than-clear old decisions to the new
contexts of social media. The result, as outlined above, is a system of overlapping,
inconsistent rules, under which one individual may be liable for an act that she
may not have considered to have any expressive value at all, while another
individual who expressed a similar sentiment might be found innocent—based on
geographic location, the prosecuting authority, and even more specific factors like
an individual judge’s attitude toward and experience with social media.
To begin to untangle the complicated patchwork of true threat standards, the
Supreme Court should act, at the next opportunity, to reestablish some uniformity
in the true threat doctrine by announcing that the true threat standard requires
measured, informed consideration of the context in which a speech act occurs, to
assess whether a speaker actually intended to threaten harm. In the meantime,
though, judges and juries who are already required to evaluate threatening
statements under a subjective-intent standard may take it upon themselves to use
insights from social science and media research to more accurately assess intent.
In requiring that factfinders rely on sufficient, logically relevant evidence when
they determine that a defendant subjectively intended to make a threat, this
limitation on the true threat exception increases protections against arbitrary or
unjustified punishment for speech, increasing the likelihood that criminal
consequences for speech are imposed only where some actually culpable conduct
has been shown.

